STATE OF UTAH, Petitioner v. THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, Respondent, ; GREG JONAS, Real Party in Interest.: Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2005
STATE OF UTAH, Petitioner v. THE
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD,
Respondent, ; GREG JONAS, Real Party in
Interest.: Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent M. Johnson; Joan C. Watt; Steven G. Shapiro; Counsel for Respondent.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; John K.
Johnson; Counsel for Petitioner.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Henriod, No. 20050311.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2577
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner 
v. 
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, 
Respondent, 
GREG JONAS, 
Real Party in Interest. 
Case No. 20050311-SC 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. .2<Z>S03lhSC 
JOAN C. WATT 
STEVEN SHAPIRO 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Ass'n 
424 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Real Parties in Interest 
BRENT M. JOHNSON 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
PO BOX 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241 
Counsel for Respondent 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 2 5 2005 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
JOHN K. JOHNSON 
Deputy Salt Lake County District 
Attorney 
Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner 
v. 




Real Party in Interest. 
Case No. 20050311-SC 
REPLY BRIEF 
JOAN C. WATT 
STEVEN SHAPIRO 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Ass'n 
424 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Real Parties in Interest 
BRENT M. JOHNSON 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
PO BOX 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
JOHN K. JOHNSON 
Deputy Salt Lake County District 
Attorney 
Counsel for Petitioner 
Counsel for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
POINT I 
This Court should apply the plain language of rule 65B where, as here, the 
Legislature has not barred "judicial review" of the challenged order 1 
A. Nothing in Article 8, section 3 of the Utah Constitution prohibits 
Rule 65B(d)(2)'s "abuse of discretion" standard 1 
B. The flagrant abuse standard applies where the Legislature attempts 
to insulate an administrative order from judicial review, not where it 
merely fails to provide an appellate remedy 5 
C. The instant writ is not the equivalent of appellate review because 
relief is a matter of discretion, not of right 7 
POINT II 
Until the Supreme Court overrules Maryland v. Craig, lower courts have no 
discretion to depart from it 9 
A. No court has ever ruled that Crawford overruled Craig, but state and 
federal courts continue to cite and apply Craig 9 
B. Crawford does not address the question presented by the instant 
case 14 
C. Craig's primary rationale is the protection of child abuse victims 
from trauma, not the admission of reliable testimony 16 
D. A lower court lacks discretion to infer that the Supreme Court 
overruled itself, but must apply the more relevant precedent 18 
E. This Court should remand for further proceedings consistent with 
Craig 21 
No Addendum Necessary 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) 18 
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) 19 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) 10,15,18 
Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) 20,21 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) passim 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) 18 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear son/American Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477 (1989) 20 
Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230 (2005) 19 
United States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2005) 10 
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) 18 
United States v. Yates, 391 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2005), 
vacated and en banc rehearing ordered, 404 F.3d 1291 12 
STATE CASES 
Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT1,106 P.3d 707 8 
Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44 3,4,5 
Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81 P.2d 374 (Utah 1938) 7 
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987) 7 
Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1991) 7 
Kawamoto v. Fratto, 2000 UT 6,994 P.2d 187 3 
ii 
L.J. Mueller Furnace Co. v. Crockett, 63 Utah 479,227 P. 270 (Utah 1924) 8 
Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice, 2003 UT15, 70 P.3d 58 3 
Petersen v. Utah Board of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1995) 5, 6, 7 
Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995) 2,5, 6 
Romero v. State, -S.W.3d - , 2005 WL. 2441921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) 11 
State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216,429 P.2d 969 (1967) 8 
State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. App. 2005) 12,13 
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,28 P.3d 1278 21,23 
Utah County v. Alexander son, 2005 UT 67 5 
Walker v. Weber County, 973 P.2d 927 (Utah 1998) 3 
STATE STATUTES AND RULES 
16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris.2d § 3934.1 (1996) 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (West 2004) ;.... 6 
Utah Const, art. 8 2 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B 1,3,8 
i i i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner 
v. 
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, 
Respondent, 
GREG JONAS, 




This Court should apply the plain language of rule 65B where, as 
here, the Legislature has not barred "judicial review" of the 
challenged order. 
Defendant's Brief of Real Party in Interest confuses (1) defendant's preferred 
writ standard with "this Court's constitutional power to issue extraordinary writs," 
(2) judicial review with appellate review, and (3) appellate review with 
extraordinary relief. Br. R.P.I. at 11-12. 
A. Nothing in Article 8, section 3 of the Utah Constitution prohibits 
Rule 65B(d)(2)'s "abuse of discretion" standard. 
Defendant does not deny that rule Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2) refers only to a 
simple abuse of discretion, but he suggests that applying the rule as written 
"expands the jurisdiction of this Court beyond its legislatively defined appellate 
jurisdiction and its constitutionally mandated extraordinary writ jurisdiction." Br. 
R.P.I. at 12. "Because the state has pointed to no provision which allows this Court 
to expand its own jurisdiction by rule," defendant continues, "the state's argument 
that Rule 65B somehow expands this Court's jurisdiction beyond its jurisdiction to 
issue common law extraordinary writs must be rejected." Id. 
The State has never argued "that Rule 65B somehow expands this Court's 
jurisdiction" beyond the powers granted by the Utah Constitution. Id. This Court's 
jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is bestowed by the Utah Constitution: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a 
court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, 
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause. 
Utah Const., art. 8, § 3. This provision does not adopt defendant's preferred writ 
standard, limiting the Court's writ jurisdiction to circumstances "where there is a 
gross and flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness are 
flouted . . ." Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677,683-84 (Utah 1995). The 
Constitution does not specify what standards apply in the various writ contexts. 
Defendant's reliance on "the traditional limits on extraordinary relief" as set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court and courts in Washington, Idaho, Hawaii, 
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and Nevada, is equally unavailing. Br. R.P.I, at 12-14. These courts do not define 
the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Moreover, the "traditional" rule in Utah is the abuse of discretion standard 
found in rule 65B(d)(2). Defendant concedes that "at least one" of this Court's prior 
decisions "arguably suggests" that a "simple abuse of discretion standard can be 
applied in deciding whether to issue an extraordinary writ." Br. R.P.I, at 15 (citing 
Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44, Tf 12). In fact, excluding Board of Pardons cases, not at 
least one, but virtually every one of this Court's rule 65B(d) decisions has applied the 
rule-based abuse of discretion standard. See Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice, 
2003 UT 15, If 29, 70 P.3d 58 (denying relief on the ground that no Utah court 
exercised personal jurisdiction over Osborne or "abused its discretion'") (quoting 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A)); Kawamoto v. Fratto, 2000 UT 6, | 7, 994 P.2d 187 
("Specifically, we review the first and second issues to determine whether the 
'inferior court . . . has . . . abused its discretion.'") (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(d)(2)(A)); Walker v. Weber County, 973 P.2d 927,929 (Utah 1998) (concluding that 
an "abuse of discretion standard" applies to extraordinary writ proceedings in the 
nature of mandamus); cf. Burke, 2005 UT 44, f^ 14 (denying writ without resolving 
the standard). 
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Defendant asserts that this Court in Burke "seemed to acknowledge that a gross 
and flagrant abuse of discretion is required when the legislature has precluded 
appellate review/7 Br. R.P.L at 16. On the contrary, in Burke this Court meticulously 
avoided adopting either standard, concluding that "we have no need to resolve the 
lingering uncertainty as to the proper standard to apply in the extraordinary writ 
context because we conclude that the district court acted within the bounds of its 
discretion." Burke, 2005 UT 44, \ 14. Since the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion, a fortiori it did not grossly and flagrantly abuse its discretion. Id. 
Defendant claims that this Court in Burke endorsed his position, whereas the 
Court was merely describing a position espoused by one of the litigants. Defendant 
writes, "In fact, both this Court and the respondent recognized that a gross and flagrant 
abuse of discretion standard is required when the legislature has set limits on 
appellate review because if a simple abuse of discretion standard were used it 
'would allow parties to essentially circumvent statutory limitations on appellate 
review/" Br. R.P.L at 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Burke, 2005 UT 44, \ 13). This 
Court in fact stated, "According to TDC, we applied the gross and flagrant abuse 
standard in Renn not simply because extraordinary relief was sought, but due to our 
concern that use of the garden variety abuse of discretion standard in such situations 
4 
would allow parties to essentially circumvent statutory limitations on appellate 
review/7 Burke, 2005 UT 44, U13 (emphasis added). 
The most defendant can claim is that this Court has expressed doubt whether 
the standard it has applied in the past is the correct one. See, e.g., Utah County v. 
Alexanderson, 2005 UT 67, \ 4 (stating that the Court granted certiorari "to review 
whether the court of appeals applied the proper standard in conducting its rule 65B 
review/' but denying relief because the petitioner had a right to appeal). 
Certainly nothing in the Utah Constitution or traditional practice requires this 
Court to depart from the abuse of discretion standard it adopted in rule 65B(d) and 
has applied in numerous cases. 
B. The flagrant abuse standard applies where the Legislature 
attempts to insulate an administrative order from judicial review, 
not where it merely fails to provide an appellate remedy. 
Defendant contends that the State must demonstrate a gross and flagrant abuse 
of discretion where the legislature has "abrogated the right to appear or "precluded 
appellate review/7 Br. R.P.1. at 16,19. This argument confuses appellate review with 
judicial review. 
This Court has applied the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard only 
twice, both times to circumvent a statute seeking to place orders of the Board of 
Pardons beyond the reach of judicial review. See Renn, 904 P.2d at 683-84; Petersen 
5 
v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148,1151-52 (Utah 1995). The statute in question 
declared that decisions of the Board "are final and are not subject to judicial review/7 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (West 2004). This language can only be read as an 
attempt to prohibit all judicial review, whether by writ, appeal, or original action in 
the district court. Id. Insulating an administrative order from judicial review is 
more sweeping and different in kind from merely not providing an avenue to appeal 
an order from one court to another. 
In Petersen, this Court recognized the difference between the Legislature's 
"refus[ing] to provide a statutory appeal from orders of a governmental agency" 
and the Legislature's attempting to "curtail the constitutional powers of this Court 
to issue extraordinary writs in appropriate circumstances." Petersen, 907 P.2d at 
1152. In the latter circumstance, "where there is a gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted, a court may, giving 
appropriate deference to legislative policy and the extraordinarily difficult duties of 
the Board of Pardons, intervene to correct such abuses by means of an appropriate 
extraordinary writ." Renn, 904 P.2d at 683-84. In order words, where the Legislature 
attempts to foreclose all judicial review, this Court retains the constitutional 
prerogative to act, but only to correct a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion 
flouting fundamental fairness. 
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That is not the situation here. In the criminal appeals statute, the Legislature 
merely "refused to provide a statutory appear from one court to another. Petersen, 
907 P.2d at 1152. It did not attempt to insulate an order from all judicial review. 
Consequently, the instant case does not require invocation of the higher standard. 
Moreover, the Legislature "is presumed [to be] aware of the legal context in 
which it acts." Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 R2d 1167,1169 (Utah 1991) 
(citing Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281,1284-85 (Utah 1987)). It thus 
presumably understood that limiting the types of appeals the prosecution could 
bring would satisfy the first prerequisite for extraordinary relief, the absence of a 
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. 
C. The instant writ is not the equivalent of appellate review because 
relief is a matter of discretion, not of right-
Defendant contends that to permit review under rule 65B/s abuse of discretion 
standard would in effect convert writ proceedings into simple appeals and thereby 
abolish statutory limits on the State's right to appeal. See Br. R.P.L at 18-20. This 
argument confuses appellate review with extraordinary writ proceedings. 
Whatever standard is employed, an extraordinary writ proceeding is not simply 
an appeal by another name. One who appeals from a final, appealable order has, 
upon demonstrating reversible error, a "right to relief." Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 
95 Utah 347, 81 P.2d 374,377 (Utah 1938). Similarly, a party seeking appeal of an 
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interlocutory order must petition the appellate court to take the appeal, but once it 
does so, the appellant, has, upon demonstrating reversible error, a "right to relief/7 
Id. 
In contrast, no one has a right to extraordinary relief. The decision to grant or 
deny an extraordinary writ "is always a matter of discretion with this court and 
never a matter of right on behalf of the applicant/7 State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 
429 P.2d 969,971 (1967) (referring to writ of mandamus). See also Bernat v. Allphin, 
2005 UT 1,1| 5,106 P.3d 707 (citing Ruggeri); L.J. Mueller Furnace Co. v. Crockett, 63 
Utah 479, 227 P. 270, 272 (Utah 1924) (stating that granting a writ of mandamus is 
"largely a matter of discretion"). Consistent with this view, the controlling rule uses 
discretionary language, stating that appropriate relief "may be granted" where an 
inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(d)(2). 
In an appeal, this Court lacks discretion to deny relief upon a showing that the 
lower court has committed reversible error. However, the Court may deny an 
extraordinary writ even where it recognizes that the lower court has committed 
error, just as it may deny certiorari review even where it recognizes that the court 
of appeals has committed error. Extraordinary relief lies solely within the Court's 
discretion. 
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Accordingly, "[o]ne of the special advantages of review by extraordinary writ 
is that it is possible to respond to a perceived need to provide occasional appellate 
guidance on matters that often elude ordinary appeal, without establishing rules of 
appealability that will bring a flood of less important appeals in their wake/7 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. 
Juris.2d § 3934.1 (1996). 
Point II 
Until the Supreme Court overrules Maryland v. Craig, lower courts 
have no discretion to depart from it 
Defendant contends that the district court here not only did not commit a gross 
and flagrant abuse of discretion, or even a simple abuse of discretion, but "correctly 
concluded that Crawford controls and requires that the core confrontation protection 
cannot be dispensed with based upon a trial court's finding of reliability/7 Br. R.P.I. 
at 21 (underlining and capitalization omitted). 
A. No court has ever ruled that Crawford overruled Craig, but state 
and federal courts continue to cite and apply Craig. 
Defendant maintains that the Supreme Court's decision in "Craig was 
abrogated by the high court's recent decision in Crawford/' Br. R.P.I, at 21. 
In support of his contention, defendant notes that "the state has not cited any 
cases in which a court has concluded that Crawford did not overrule Craig/7 Br. R.P.L 
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at 41. This is true. The State is not aware of any case stating that Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), did not overrule Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 
(1990). In fact, the State is not aware of any case even discussing the possibility. 
Cases uniformly continue to treat Craig as good law. 
For example, United States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2005), was decided 
after the State filed its opening brief. Kappell appealed a jury conviction for 
multiple counts of child sexual abuse. Id. at 552. The children testified at trial. Id. 
at 553. The trial court found that the children feared Kappell and "would suffer 
emotional trauma from testifying in open court in the presence of [Kappell]/' Id. 
Accordingly, "they testified in a room outside the courtroom and the jury viewed 
their testimony over closed-circuit television monitors/' Id. Because Kappell did not 
object to this procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
analyzed his Confrontation Clause claim under the plain error doctrine. Id. at 554. 
It found no plain error. Id. 
The court analyzed the issue under Craig. It concluded that "[n]othing in 
Kappell's trial violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause." Id. "He was 
able to, and did, confront all of the witnesses against him. The children gave direct 
testimony and he cross-examined them." Id. The court continued, "Although the 
children testified not in the courtroom but in another room and their testimony was 
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viewed on closed circuit television, Kappell acquiesced in that arrangement/' Id. 
In support of its holding, the Sixth Circuit cited Craig: 
Cf Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,840-60,110 S. Ct. 3157,11L. Ed.2d 666 
(1990) (holding that a state statutory procedure that permitted "a child 
witness who is alleged to be the victim of child abuse" to testify against the 
alleged perpetrator by one-way closed circuit television did not 
categorically violate the Confrontation Clause). 
Id. 
Kappell argued "that under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford, 
the trial in his case denied him his right to confrontation." Id. "That argument," the 
Sixth Circuit declared, "rests upon a misinterpretation of Crawford/' Id. Crawford 
"involved the admissibility under the Confrontation Clause of recorded testimonial 
statements of a person who did not testify at the trial." Id. at 555. "The holding in 
Crawford was that such statements, regardless of their reliability, are not admissible 
unless the defendant was able to cross-examine their maker." Id. However," [i]n the 
present case, in sharp contrast, the two witnesses (the children) did testify and were 
cross-examined." Id. The Sixth Circuit never suggested the Crawford had overruled 
Craig. 
Romero v. State, - S.W.3d - , 2005 WL 2441921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), was 
decided after defendant filed his brief. The question before the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals was whether Romero's right to be confronted with the witnesses 
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against him was violated when a witness testified in disguise. Id. at *1. The majority 
did not cite Crawford, but analyzed the issue under Craig. Reasoning that "[c] aiming 
an adult witness's fears is quite a different thing from protecting a child victim from 
serious emotional trauma/' the court found a Confrontation Clause violation. Id. at 
*3. Two judges dissented, also analyzing the issue under Craig. See id. at *4-*6. No 
one suggested the Craig had been overruled. See also United States v. Yates, 391 F.3d 
1182 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that Craig was violated when adult witnesses testified 
by two-way video teleconference from Australia), vacated and en banc rehearing 
ordered, 404 F.3d 1291. 
Defendant sees support for his position that Crawford overruled Craig in State 
v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 320 (Md. App. 2005), a case cited in the State's opening 
brief. See Br. R.P.I, at 43-44. Snowden involved child victims, but the children did not 
testify at trial via closed circuit television or any other method. Snowden, 867 A.2d 
at 319. The issue on appeal was whether their out-of-court statements were 
testimonial. Id. at 325. Thus, the holding of Craig was not at issue in that case. The 
State cited it merely to demonstrate that courts continue to cite Craig without stating 
that the case was overruled. 
Unable to find any passage in Snowden stating that Crawford overruled Craig, 
defendant nevertheless argues that "the court's final reference to Craig, apparently 
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overlooked by the state when it chose Snowden to support its argument, suggests 
that the Snowden court did not think that Craig survived Crawford because the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees face to face confrontation/' Br. R.P.L at 43-44. 
What defendant calls the court's "final reference" to Craig was in fact not its 
final reference. The court's final reference to Craig establishes beyond cavil that the 
Snowden court viewed Craig as good law: 
Amicus's argument that children must be treated differently in the court 
system generally only becomes relevant once the prosecution decides to 
call the children to the stand to testify. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,110 
S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed.2d 666 (1990). In determining the testimonial quality 
of a statement, however, it is the circumstances of the statement that is 
paramount, and not necessarily the nature of some inherent characteristic 
of the declarant. 
Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329, n.20. The court's point is that Craig is not relevant to 
determine whether a child's out-of-court statement is testimonial, but is relevant 
where the prosecution decides to call the child as a witness. Obviously, if Craig had 
been overruled, it would not be relevant to that or any other inquiry. 
Although defendant labels Craig "antiquated," he is unable to cite any case, and 
the State is aware of none, stating that it has been overruled. Br. R.P.L at 21. On the 
contrary, courts continue to treat Craig as good law. 
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B. Crawford does not address the question presented by the instant 
case. 
Defendant asserts that "Crawford makes it clear not only that the reliability test 
of Roberts is overruled, but also that the explicit language mandating face to face 
confrontation defines the nature of the right. . ." Br. R.P.I, at 29. 
Of course, the Sixth Amendment contains no "explicit language" mandating 
face-to-face confrontation; it guarantees merely that an accused be "confronted 
with" the witnesses against him. That defendant refers repeatedly to "face to face 
confrontation" is tacitly acknowledgment that "confrontation" alone is not explicit 
on this point. As the Court stated in Craig, "Given our hearsay cases, the word 
'confronted,' as used in the Confrontation Clause, cannot simply mean face-to-face 
confrontation . . . " Craig, 497 U.S. at 849. 
More to the point, to read Crawford as holding that the Sixth Amendment 
requires physical confrontation is to misread Crawford. That issue was not before the 
Court in that case. In Crawford, the trial court admitted a tape recording of a 
statement Crawford's wife had made to police. See id. at 40. The wife did not testify. 
Id. Because she did not testify, she was not subjected to confrontation by any 
definition. The Crawford Court was not presented with, and did not purport to 
decide, the question of whether confrontation by closed-circuit television in a child 
abuse case can satisfy the Sixth Amendment. 
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Moreover, the touchstone of confrontation for Crawford is cross-examination, 
not facing one's accuser. The majority opinion refers to cross-examination 41 times. 
See id. at 38-68. In contrast, it refers to facing one's accuser only four times, three of 
which are descriptions of pre-revolutionary English practice. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 43,44,57. Even the pages of the opinion defendant cites for the proposition that 
"Crawford makes it clear . . . that the explicit language mandating face to face 
confrontation defines the nature of the right/' Br. R.P.I, at 29 (citing Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 67-68), contain no reference to face-to-face confrontation. They do, however, 
refer to cross-examination three times. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68. In fact, that 
portion of the opinion comes close to equating confrontation with cross-
examination: 
In this case, the State admitted Sylvia's testimonial statement against 
petitioner, despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine 
her. That alone is sufficient to make out a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment. Roberts notwithstanding, we decline to mine the record in 
search of indicia of reliability. Where testimonial statements are at issue, 
the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands 
is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation. 
Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added). 
It is risky to read too much into these references. The Crawford Court was not 
concerned with whether granting a defendant the "full opportunity for 
contemporaneous cross-examination/' and permitting the judge, jury, and 
15 
defendant to view the witness by video monitor is "functionally equivalent" to "live, 
in-person testimony." Craig, 497 U.S. at 851. That was the issue in Craig, and is the 
issue here. 
C. Craig's primary rationale is the protection of child abuse victims 
from trauma, not the admission of reliable testimony. 
Defendant contends that Craig did not survive Crawford because "[e]ven the 
most superficial reading of Craig demonstrates that its holding... was based on the 
reliability rationale of Roberts [v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)]." Br. R.P.I. at 33. 
On the contrary, a thoughtful reading of Maryland v. Craig demonstrates that 
it is not simply another application of the reliability test announced in Ohio v. 
Roberts. Although the Craig Court would undoubtedly not have approved what it 
believed was an unreliable procedure, the driving force behind the opinion was not 
reliability, but the protection of child witnesses. 
The Court was willing to carve out an exception to face-to-face confrontation 
only where doing so "is necessary to further an important public policy and only 
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Craig, 497 U.S. at 850. 
The Court declared that "'the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further 
trauma and embarrassment' is a 'compelling one/" Id. at 852 (quoting Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). In fact, 
the Court had recently upheld a state statute that proscribed the possession and 
16 
viewing of child pornography on the ground that "a State's interest in 'safeguarding 
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling/" Id. at 852-53 
(quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,109 (1990)). Similarly, "a State's interest in the 
physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently 
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her 
accusers in court." Id. at 853. The Court thus held that, where the State makes an 
adequate showing of necessity, "the state interest in protecting child witnesses from 
the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case" is "sufficiently important to justify the 
use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial 
against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant." 
Id. at 855. 
The primary rationale for Craig's holding, therefore, was the protection of child 
victims from further trauma. Obviously, the Court was not going to permit such 
testimony if it was unreliable; the Roberts reliability test was prevailing law in 1990, 
when Craig was decided. And Craig recognizes that minimizing the trauma 
experienced by a child witness will at least protect, if not enhance, the reliability of 
that testimony. Id. at 856-57. But the "necessity" the Court identified as justifying 
an exception to the general rule of face-to-face confrontation was the necessity to 
protect children, not the necessity to admit all reliable evidence. In fact, the majority 
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opinion mentions trauma and its variants more than twice as many times (19) as it 
mentions reliable and its variants (9). 
Constitutional guarantees are not absolute, even when cast in categorical terms. 
For example, even Justice Scalia recognizes an exception to the First Amendment 
guarantee of freedom of the press for obscene and "sexually provocative" 
publications. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,831-
32 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, he joined the majority opinion in 
Osborne, which, in a First Amendment context, declared that "a State's interest in 
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling." 
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Justice Scalia has 
similarly acknowledged a possible Confrontation Clause exception for dying 
declarations. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, n.6. 
Because Craig's primary rationale was to advance the societal interest in 
protecting children—a goal that even Justice Scalia shares in other 
contexts —assuming that Craig was swept away in the tide that toppled Ohio v. 
Roberts is a grave error, and one that no appellate court has yet made. 
D. A lower court lacks discretion to infer that the Supreme Court 
overruled itself, but must apply the more relevant precedent 
The State's opening brief cited Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,237 (1997), for the 
proposition that '"[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet 
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appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower court] 
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative 
of overruling its own decisions/" Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ 
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,484 (1989)). 
Defendant responds by distinguishing Agostini on its facts. See Br. R.P.I, at 37-
39. He argues that" [i]n contrast to Agostini, Craig does not directly control this case 
because it did not analyze Utah's rule." Id. at 38. He also argues that "the question 
in Agostini was whether there had even been a change in the law that would allow 
a lower court to overturn a Supreme Court decision that was directly on pont." Id. 38 
(emphasis). On the contrary, there are no circumstances that "would allow a lower 
court to overturn a Supreme Court decision." Id. Only the Supreme Court can 
overturn Supreme Court precedent. This rule is well settled law not tied to the 
particular facts of Agostini or any other case. See, e.g., Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230, 
1237 (2005) (quoting Rodriguez)', American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 
167,180 (1990) (same). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit went so far as to state, 
"We may not reject, dismiss, disregard, or deny Supreme Court precedent, even if, 
in a particular case, it seems pellucidly clear to litigants, lawyers, and lower court 
judges alike that, given the opportunity, the Supreme Court would overrule its 
19 
precedent/' Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720,722 (5th Cir. 1996). Such an anticipatory 
overruling has been called "an indefensible brand of judicial activism." Rodriguez, 
490 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
The State is not insisting that this Court "blindly follow the analysis used in 
Craig," Br. R.P.I, at 37, any more than defendant is insisting that this Court blindly 
follow the analysis used in Crawford. The State is merely asking this Court to 
consider both precedents and, as it would normally do, follow the one that more 
directly applies. Crawford involved admission at trial of the tape-recorded statement 
of an adult who did not testify. Craig involved a child witness who testified at trial 
via closed-circuit television. As defendant rightly observes, Utah's criminal rule 15.5 
differs slightly from the Maryland rule at issue in Craig. See Br. R.P.I, at 38. But, like 
Craig and unlike Crawford, the case at bar involves a child witness testifying by 
closed circuit television. 
To disregard Craig on the basis of defendant's argument—that "Crawford 
plainly rejected Craig's approach"—would be to engage in the very "judicial 
activism" that the Supreme Court forbids. Br. R.P.I, at 37; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 486 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). This is especially true here, where it is far from "pellucidly 
clear to litigants, lawyers, and lower court judges alike that, given the opportunity, 
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the Supreme Court would overrule its precedent/7 Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 722. On the 
contrary, no court other than the trial court here has even suggested it. 
E. This Court should remand for further proceedings consistent 
with Craig. 
Defendant contends that "even if Craig remained good law after Crawford, 
reversal of the trial court's order is not required in this case where the trial court has 
not made the requisite findings of necessity/7 Br. R.P.L at 45. 
Defendant is correct that the trial did not make the requisite Craig findings 
below. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-856; State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 58,28 P.3d 1278 
(quoting Craig). Having wrongly decided that Craig was overruled and therefore 
had no application, the court had no reason to make Craig findings. See R. 258; Br. 
Pet. at 13-16. The State also agrees that "it cannot ask this Court to assume the trial 
court would make findings based on a consideration of the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the state." Br. R.P.I, at 47. 
However, it does not follow that "dispensing with face to face confrontation 
would violate the Sixth Amendment even if Craig applied/' Id. 
The record contains ample evidence to support the Craig findings. Dr. Miles 
concluded in her report that "Megan has the capacity to provide reliable testimony 
to the extent her emotional trauma can be reduced. However, if Megan were 
required to testify before her father, it is unlikely that she would be willing to 
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disclose the alleged abuse/7 R. 246-47. She stated that "Megan has witnessed her 
father's violence, threats, and anger, and she is fearful for her own safety as well as 
that of her mother. Megan's fear of her father is highly likely to block her ability to 
think rationally and to express herself coherently, if she would talk at all." Id. 
Requiring Megan to testify before her father "would likely undermine the progress 
that she has made to date in treatment, and would further traumatize her." Id. 
Dr. Miles testified at the hearing that, with respect to Megan's ability to testify 
outside the presence of defendant, "to the degree that the emotional trauma can be 
minimized,... I think that she's going to be able to do that." R. 267:23-24. She also 
testified, "I think that if she is required to testify in court—in this setting, in the 
presence of her father—that her anxiety and fear will just block her ability to even 
kind of answer the questions . . ." R. 267: 38. She concluded that "not only would 
it incapacitate her in this setting, I think the impact afterwards will also be very — it's 
going to take her longer to recover and reach some more normal emotional plane." 
Id. 
Based on this evidence, a court may reasonably conclude, and indeed might 
have no alternative but to conclude, (1) that the closed circuit television procedure 
is necessary to protect Megan's welfare; (2) that Megan would be traumatized, not 
by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant, and (3) that the 
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emotional distress Megan would suffer in defendant's presence is more than mere 
nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56; 
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 58,28 P.31278 (quoting Craig). 
Fortunately, this case is in an interlocutory posture. Therefore, the appropriate 
course is to remand with instructions to the trial court to make appropriate findings 
on the Craig factors and to ensure compliance with rule 15.5(2), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
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